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 Executive Summary 
 
 
 
     Progressive collapse of a building can be regarded as the situation where local failure 
of a primary structural component leads to the collapse of adjoining members and to an 
overall damage which is disproportionate to the initial cause. 
 
     The problem of progressive collapse in civil engineering gained interest in 1968, after 
the partial collapse of the Ronan Point apartment building in London UK. Following this 
event, intensive research effort led to developing progressive collapse strategies and 
methods and resulted in the first progressive collapse provisions in the UK standards. 
Even current methods and strategies benefit to a great extent from the approaches 
developed at that time. A second and third wave of progressive collapse interest by the 
civil engineering community appeared after the disproportionate collapse of the A.P. 
Murrah Federal Building (Oklahoma City, 1995) and the total collapse of the World 
Trade Center towers, both caused by terrorist attacks. 
  
     Progressive collapse can be triggered by many different actions. Examples of such 
actions can be: explosions caused by gas or explosives; impacts of vehicles, ships or 
planes; earthquakes; human errors in the design or construction phase etc. The prediction 
of such events and abnormal actions is very difficult and depends on many factors. From 
the security point of view, progressive collapse is of particular importance as buildings 
and other critical infrastructures often become the target of terrorist bombing attacks. A 
structure should be capable to suffer local damage but to prevent excessive spreading of 
it to other members. However, designing a large building against progressive collapse 
due to blast loading is quite a challenge because of the several assumptions and  
unknown parameters involved: the quantity and type of the explosive charge, the distance 
from the building where the explosive is detonated, whether the blast affects corner or 
central columns of the building etc. These difficulties make that there are effectively no 
provisions in the national construction codes and standards for the design of structures to 
resist external explosions or internal explosions caused by explosives.  
 
     This report presents several definitions and proposals of robustness measures of 
structures, and it provides a review of procedures and strategies for progressive collapse 
design based on selected codes, standards and guidelines mainly from the EU and USA. 
As shown, the early developed design approaches for progressive collapse mitigation are 
divided into indirect and direct ones. Indirect approaches consist of applying prescriptive 
design rules (minimum requirements on strength, continuity, ductility, redundancy), 
contributing to the resistance to progressive collapse. However progressive collapse 
behaviour is not addressed explicitly. These indirect design approaches address the 
problem by identifying and incorporating into the building system characteristics that 
enhance robustness, without special consideration to loads or events that could trigger 
disproportionate collapse. On the other hand, direct approaches involve a performance-
based design and consist of the specific local resistance method (the design of some “key 
elements”  to resist a sufficiently high pressure) and the alternate load path method. 
 
     The report also includes some real cases of progressive collapses, it provides a 
representative view of research efforts in the field, as reported in international journals 
and conferences, and points out knowledge gaps. 
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1. Introduction
This is an updated version of the previous report on literature survey in robust-
ness and progressive collapse of structures, which can be considered as the situation
where local failure of a primary structural component leads to the collapse of ad-
joining members and to an overall damage which is disproportionate to the initial
cause.
The problem of progressive collapse in civil engineering gained its interest as early
as 1968, after the Ronan Point apartment building partial collapse, London, the UK.
Right after this event, many research efforts led to developing progressive collapse
strategies and methods as well as resulted in first progressive collapse provisions in
the UK standards. Even current methods and strategies benefit to a great extent
from the approaches developed in that time. As summarised by Moore [54], those
provisions helped in many cases to avoid other progressive collapses, afterwards,
in the UK. A second and third wave of progressive collapse interest by the civil
engineering community appeared after the disproportionate collapse of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building (Oklahoma City, 1995) and the total collapse of the
World Trade Center towers, both caused by terrorist attacks.
Progressive collapse can be triggered by many different actions. Examples of such
actions can be: explosions caused by gas or explosives; impacts of vehicles, ships or
planes; earthquakes human errors in the design or construction phase etc. Prediction
of such abnormal actions is very difficult and depends on many factors. Designing
for example a large frame reinforced concrete building against progressive collapse
due to blast loading is a big challenge. Analysing such a building and checking
if a progressive collapse could happen or not depends on many assumptions. For
example the major unknowns are: how big the explosive charge is (what is the peak
pressure), how far from the building the explosive is detonated, and whether the
blast affects the corner load-bearing elements of the building or the ones situated in
the middle of the building’s sides etc.
These difficulties make that there are effectively no provisions in the national
codes and standards to design structures to resist external explosions or internal
explosions caused by explosives. Thus instead of explicit analysis of a structure to a
specific blast load, the current codes, standards and guidelines recommend a threat
independent design, that is the design due to an unspecified cause, or to design some
elements (key elements) to resist a sufficiently high pressure (e.g. 34 kPa).
Those early developed design approaches for progressive collapse mitigation can
be divided into indirect and direct approaches. Indirect approaches consist in apply-
ing prescriptive design rules (minimum requirements on strength, continuity, ductil-
ity, redundancy), providing resistance to progressive collapse; however progressive
collapse behaviour is not addressed explicitly. In other words, indirect design ap-
proach addresses the problem by identifying and incorporating into the building sys-
tem characteristics that enhance robustness, without special consideration of loads
or events that could trigger disproportionate collapse. Direct design approaches
involve a performance-based approach and consist of the specific local resistance
method and the alternate load path method.
This report contains 6 Chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the topic.
In Chapter 2 the main terms and definitions related to progressive collapse are
presented. Chapter 3 provides a review of procedures and strategies for progressive
collapse design based on selected codes and standards, e.g. ASCE 7 [5], BS 5628
[9], BS 5950 [10], BS 6399 [11], BS 8110 [12], EN 1991 [27], and U.S. guidelines, e.g.
DoD UFC Guidelines [20], GSA Guidelines [40]. Chapter 4 constitutes a review of
research efforts in the field of progressive collapse reported in international journals
and conference papers. Different proposals of robustness measures of structures
are also presented in this chapter. In Chapter 5 a few examples of progressive
collapses of real buildings are described. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary
and conclusions. Two appendices, containing respectively some useful elements on
plastic analysis and on blast loading of structures, are included.
2
2. Terms and definitions
In different publications, the common used terms regarding progressive collapse
can have broader or narrower scope and are sometimes used with slightly different
meaning. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to give a list of the terms with their
definitions.
Progressive collapse – the spread of an initial local failure from element to
element, resulting eventually, in the collapse of an entire structure or a dispropor-
tionately large part of it (ASCE 7 [5]).
Progressive collapse – the spread of local damage from an initiating event,
from element to element, resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a dispro-
portionate large part of it; known as disproportionate collapse (NIST Best Practices
[56]).
Progressive collapse – a situation where local failure of a primary structural
component leads to the collapse of adjoining members which, in turn, leads to ad-
ditional collapse. Hence, the total damage is disproportionate to the original cause
(GSA Guidelines [40]).
Progressive collapse – this term is indirectly defined in the EN 1990 [26],
where the code treats the basic requirements a structure should satisfy: “A struc-
ture shall be designed and executed in such a way that it will not be damaged by
events such as explosions, impact or the consequences of human errors, to an extent
disproportionate to the original cause.” EN 1990 [26], 2.1(4)
Robustness – the ability of a structure to withstand events like fire, explosions,
impact or the consequences of human error, without being damaged to an extent
disproportionate to the original cause (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Robustness – the ability of a structure or structural components to resist dam-
age without premature and/or brittle failure due to events like explosions, impacts,
fire or consequences of human error, due to its vigorous strength and toughness
(GSA Guidelines [40]).
Robustness – insensitivity of a structure to local failure, where “insensitivity”
and “local failure” are to be quantified by the design objectives (Starossek and
Haberland [69]). Defined in this way, robustness is a property of the structure alone
and is independent of possible causes of initial local failure. This definition is in
contrast to a broader definition of robustness – as it is given, for instance, in EN
81991-1-7 [28] – which does include possible causes of initial failure. Such a broader
definition is close to the term collapse resistance as defined below.
Collapse Resistance – insensitivity of a structure to accidental circumstances,
which are low probability events and unforeseeable incidents. The accidental cir-
cumstances are to be quantified by the design objectives. Collapse resistance is a
property that is influenced by numerous conditions including both structural fea-
tures and possible causes of initial failure. (Starossek [65], Starossek and Haberland
[69]).
Key element – a structural member upon which the stability of the remainder
of the structure depends (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Key element – structural elements whose notional removal would cause collapse
of an unacceptable extent. They should therefore be designed for accidental loads,
which are specified in several standards as 34 kPa (NIST Best Practices [56]).
Localised failure – the part of a structure that is assumed to have collapsed,
or been severely disabled, by an accidental event (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Continuity – refers to the continuous connection of components as well as the
continuous reinforcement of concrete components. Integrity, redundancy and/or
local resistance can be improved by continuity. Continuity is thus an element of
robustness (Starossek and Haberland [69]).
Damage tolerance – the term is compatible with the term robustness used by
Lind [46]. In some other papers, the damage tolerance meaning is narrower and
refers to the ability of a structure to resist a continuous local deterioration due to
corrosion or similar (Starossek and Haberland [69]).
Ductility – the ability of a component or structural system to withstand large
plastic deformations. Ductility has a large influence on progressive collapse and is
often listed as a factor which increases the robustness of the structure (Starossek
and Haberland [69]).
Ductility – the ability of a structure to remain stable after large deforma-
tions (rotations and deflections). There are different means for steel and reinforced
concrete structures to provide sufficient ductility. Steel – using steel with high
toughness, connections which exceed the strength of the base material. Reinforced
concrete structures – confinement of reinforcing steel, continuity through lap splices,
maintaining overall structural stability, and creating connections between elements
that exceed the strength and toughness of the base members etc. (NIST Best Prac-
tices [56]).
Integrity – the term is mainly used in U.S. standards such as ACI 318 [2],
ASCE 7 [5], often in relation with prescriptive requirements (like requirements for
continuity, ductility, and redundancy). Integrity implies that the structure and its
9components remain intact over the intended lifetime of the structure (Starossek and
Haberland [69]).
Redundancy – Structural redundancy refers to the multiple availability of
load-carrying components or multiple load paths which can bear additional loads in
the event of a failure. If one or more components fail, the remaining structure is
able to redistribute the loads and thus prevent a failure of the entire system. Redun-
dancy depends on the geometry of the structure and the properties of the individual
load-carrying elements (Frangopol and Curley [39]). It is not synonymous with the
static indeterminacy. Redundancy is mentioned as an important factor in the design
of robust structures and hence the prevention of progressive collapse (EN 1991-1-7
[28]). Redundancy refers particularly to the alternate load path method (Starossek
and Haberland [69]).
Redundancy – the incorporation of redundant load paths in the vertical load
carrying system to ensure that alternate load paths are available in the event of
local failure of structural elements (NIST Best Practices [56]).
Vulnerability – describes the sensitivity of a structure to damage events.
A structure is vulnerable if small damages lead to disproportionate consequences.
Vulnerability is opposite to robustness and it is a property of the structural system
(Starossek and Haberland [69]).
Ties – The loss of a major structural element typically results in load redis-
tributions and member deflections. These processes require the transfer of loads
throughout the structure (vertically and horizontally) through load paths. The
ability of a structure to re-distribute or transfer loads along these load paths is
based in large part on the interconnectivity between adjacent members. This is
often called “tying a building together” by using an integrated system of ties in
three directions along the principal lines of structural framing. Fig. 3.4 taken from
DoD UFC Guidelines [20], illustrates the different types of ties that are typically
incorporated to provide structural integrity to a building (NIST Best Practices [56]).
Direct design for progressive collapse – explicit consideration of progressive
collapse during the design process through either: alternate load path method or
specific local resistance method (ASCE 7 [5]).
Indirect design for progressive collapse – implicit consideration to progres-
sive collapse during the design process through the provision of minimum levels of
strength, continuity and ductility (ASCE 7 [5]).
Specific local resistance method (Key element method) – a method that
seeks to provide sufficient strength to resist failure from accidents or misuse. In other
words, a critical load bearing element is explicitly designed to resist the prescribed
load level (ASCE 7 [5]).
Alternate load path method – a method that allows local failure to occur,
but seeks to provide alternate load paths so that the damage is absorbed and major
collapse is averted (ASCE 7 [5]).
Risk – a measure of the combination (usually the product) of the probabilities or
frequency of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences
of the occurrence (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Consequences – a possible result of an event. Consequences may be expressed
verbally or numerically in terms of loss of life, injury, economic loss, environmental
damage, disruption to users and the public, etc. Both immediate consequences and
those that arise after a certain time has elapsed are to be included (EN 1991-1-7
[28]).
Risk analysis – a systematic approach for describing and/or calculating risk.
Risk analysis involves the identification of undesired events, and the causes and
consequences of these events (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Risk evaluation – a comparison of the results of a risk analysis with the ac-
ceptance criteria for risk and other decision criteria (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Risk management – systematic measures undertaken by an organisation in
order to attain and maintain a level of safety that complies with defined objectives
(EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Risk acceptance criteria – these criteria are normally determined by the au-
thorities to reflect the level of risk considered to be acceptable by people and society.
They correspond to acceptable limits to probabilities of certain consequences of an
undesired event and are expressed in terms of annual frequencies (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Deflagration – propagation of a combustion zone at a velocity that is less than
the speed of sound in the unreacted medium (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
Detonation – propagation of a combustion zone at a velocity that is greater
than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium (EN 1991-1-7 [28]).
3. Review of procedures and strategies for
progressive collapse design
3.1. British Standards
The United Kingdom was the first country which incorporated the progressive
collapse provisions to its standards. The need for this kind of regulations emerged
after the Ronan Point partial collapse (see details in Sec. 5.1). General information
on how to design structure against progressive collapse is given in BS 6399 [11], while
specific provisions for steel, concrete and masonry structures are given in BS 5950
[10], BS 8110 [12] and BS 5628 [9], respectively. Below there are presented main
topics of progressive collapse design which can subsequently be used for comparison
with other documents.
3.1.1. Load combinations
For bridging design (alternate load path method), British Standards recommend
applying the load combinations as follows
D +W/3 + L/3 (3.1)
where: D - dead load, W - wind load, L - imposed load.
3.1.2. Horizontal ties
Steel structures
Steel elements designed as horizontal ties and their end connections should be
capable of resisting factored tensile loads as follows:
• internal ties
Ti = 0.5(1.4gk + 1.6qk)stL but not less than 75 kN, (3.2)
where:
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gk – the specified dead load per unit area of the floor or roof,
qk – the specified imposed floor or roof load per unit area,
L – the span,
st – the mean transverse spacing of the ties adjacent to that being checked.
• edge ties
Te = 0.25(1.4gk + 1.6qk)stL but not less than 75 kN. (3.3)
Reinforced concrete structures
• internal ties
Ti =
gk + qk
7.5
lr
5
Ft or 1.0Ft (3.4)
where:
gk – characteristic dead load (in kN/m
2),
qk – characteristic imposed floor load,
lr – greater of the distances between the centres of the columns, frames or
walls supporting any two adjacent floor spaces in the direction of the tie
under consideration,
Ft – basic strength, lesser of (20 + 4no) or 60 kN,
no – number of storeys.
• peripheral ties
At each floor and roof level an effectively continuous peripheral tie should be
designed, capable to resist a tensile force of 1.0Ft, located within 1.2m of the
edge of the building or within the perimeter wall.
3.1.3. Vertical ties
Vertical ties should ensure continuous tying of the structure from the lowest to
the highest level. The column or a wall designed as a vertical tie should be capable
to resist a tensile force equal to the maximum design ultimate dead and imposed
load.
3.1.4. Design of bridging elements (alternate load path)
Steel structures
If the conditions for the tie forces cannot be met, the building should be checked
to ensure that the notional removal of a column (at each level, one at a time) will
not lead to disproportionate collapse.
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Reinforced concrete structures
For buildings of 5 or more storeys, when the tie forces criteria cannot be met,
the structure should be analysed upon removal of a load-bearing element (a column
or a portion of wall between lateral supports).
3.1.5. Key elements
Steel structures
If the conditions for the tie forces are not satisfied and upon a column removal
the building is suspected to total collapse or the area of the collapsed portion is
greater than 15% or 70m2, then that column or element should be designed as a key
element. The column or element is deemed as key element if it can resist the pressure
of 34 kN/m2.
Reinforced concrete structures
Similarly to the steel structures, the key element should be capable to withstand
a design ultimate load of 34 kN/m2 from each direction. This design ultimate load
value should not include a partial safety factor.
3.2. Eurocodes
The Eurocodes (EN 1990 [26], EN 1991 [27], EN 1992 [29], EN 1993 [30], EN
1994 [31], EN 1995 [32], EN 1996 [33], EN 1997 [34], EN 1998 [35], EN 1999 [36])
are a set of European codes for designing and constructing civil engineering struc-
tures. Accidental actions are specifically dealt in EN 1991-1-7 [28], however since
the Eurocodes are treated as a whole, there are many references to other parts, in
particular, to EN 1990 [26] and EN 1991 [27] etc.
EN 1991-1-7 [28] gives provisions (strategies and rules) for designing buildings
against identifiable and unidentifiable accidental actions. However, as it is written in
the Eurocode, “EN 1991-1-7 does not specifically deal with accidental actions caused
by external explosions, warfare and terrorist activities, or the residual stability of
buildings or other civil engineering works damaged by seismic action or fire etc.”
(EN 1991-1-7 [28], 1.1(6)). Thus when designing a structure against a possible threat
of a terrorist attack, the design must be conducted according to provisions for an
unspecified accidental action. Some of the material below is included in the rules
and other in the informative Annexes.
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According to EN 1991-1-7 [28] the strategies for accidental design situations are
illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Therefore, if an accidental action is identified we may try to
Figure 3.1. Strategies for accidental design situations (EN 1991-1-7 [28])
prevent or reduce the action by protective measures, we can design the structure for
sufficient robustness or to sustain the action. On the other hand, if we allow a local
damage, then the aim of the design is to either enhance structural redundancy by
alternate load path method, or to ensure structural integrity and ductility.
Potential damage can be avoided or limited by appropriate choice of one or more
of the following actions:
• avoiding, eliminating or reducing the hazards to which the structure can be
subjected,
• selecting a structural form which has low sensitivity to hazards considered,
• selecting a structural form and design that can survive adequately the acciden-
tal removal of an individual member or a limited part of the structure, or the
occurrence of acceptable localised damage,
• avoiding as far as possible structural systems that can collapse without warning,
• tying the structural members together. EN 1990 [26], 2.1(5)
The strategies for accidental design situations depend on three consequences
classes defined in EN 1990 [26]. These consequences classes (CC) include:
CC1 – low consequences of failure,
CC2 – medium consequences of failure,
CC3 – high consequences of failure.
EN 1991 [27] assigns accidental design situations for different consequences
classes as follows:
CC1 – no particular consideration is necessary for accidental actions other than
satisfying rules for stability and robustness given in other Eurocodes (EN 1990
[26] to EN 1999 [36]),
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CC2 – depending on specific conditions of the structure, a simplified analysis by
static equivalent action models may be adopted or prescriptive design and de-
tailing rules may be applied,
CC3 – a more detailed consideration of the specific case should be done to determine
the level of reliability and the depth of structural analyses required. A risk
assessment as well as advanced analysis method (nonlinear dynamic analysis)
may be required.
Annex A of the EN 1991-1-7 [28] gives a categorisation of buildings types with
regard to consequences classes. A simplified version of the Table A.1 of EN 1991-1-7
[28] can be represented as follows:
CC1 – single occupancy houses not exceeding 4 storeys, agricultural buildings,
buildings rarely occupied by people etc.;
CC2a (lower risk group) – 5 storey single occupancy houses, hotels, flats, apart-
ments, other residential buildings, offices not exceeding 4 storeys etc.;
CC2b (upper risk group) – hotels, flats, apartments and other residential build-
ings greater than 4 storeys but less than 15 storeys etc.;
CC3 – all buildings defined for classes CC2a and CC2b that exceed the limits on
area or number of storeys, all buildings occupied by people in significant numbers,
stadia for more than 5000 spectators, buildings containing dangerous substances
and processes etc.
Based on these categorisation, the following strategies are recommended:
a) for buildings in Consequences Class 1: as mentioned before no specific design
procedure is needed other than those for designing and constructing buildings in
accordance with the rules in other Eurocodes,
b) for buildings in Consequences Class 2a (lower group): additional procedure in-
clude applying appropriate effective horizontal ties, or effective anchorage of sus-
pended walls as defined in 3.2.2,
c) for buildings in Consequences Class 2b (upper group):
• horizontal and vertical ties as defined in 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 should be provided;
• the building should be analysed to check if the notional removal of each sup-
porting column and each beam supporting a column, or any nominal section
of load-bearing wall will not cause local damage greater than the specified
limits and not cause total collapse. Where the notional removal of such
columns and sections of walls would result in exceeding the specified limits
for local damage, then those elements should be redesigned or designed as
a ”key element” (see 3.2.4),
d) for buildings in Consequences Class 3: A systematic risk assessment of the build-
ing should be performed, taking into account both foreseeable and unforeseeable
hazards according to Annex B of EN 1991-1-7 [28].
In Annex A of the EN 1991-1-7 [28] there are given rules and methods for de-
signing buildings to sustain an extent of localised failure from an unspecified cause
without disproportionate collapse.
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3.2.1. Load combinations
Accidental actions shall be applied simultaneously in combination with perma-
nent and variable loads in accordance with (EN 1990 [26], 6.4.3.3).
Combination of actions for accidental design situations in the ultimate limit
states according to (EN 1990 [26], 6.4.3.3) is as follows
∑
j≥1
Gk,j + P + Ad + (ψ1,1 or ψ2,1)Qk,1 +
∑
i>1
ψ2,iQk,i (3.5)
where:
G – permanent load (dead load),
P – relevant representative value of a prestressing action (see EN 1992 to EN 1996
and EN 1998 to EN 1999),
Ad – design accidental action,
Q – variable load (live load, snow load, wind load),
ψ1 – factor for frequent value of a variable action,
ψ2 – factor for quasi-permanent value of a variable action.
Accidental action Ad should be taken as an explicit accidental action Ad for fire
or impact or can refer to the situation after an accidental event. In this case Ad
is equal to zero. Recommended values for ψ1 and ψ2, depending on the building
categories, can be found in Table A1.1 of Annex A EN 1990 [26].
In the paragraph EN 1990 [26], 4.1.2(8), it reads as follows “For accidental actions
the design value Ad should be specified for individual projects based on EN 1991
[27]”.
When analysing a structure in a quasi-static way, the dynamic effects can be
included by applying an equivalent dynamic amplification factor to the static actions,
EN 1990 [26], 5.1.3(3). However it is not specified in the Eurocodes what value for
the dynamic amplification factor is recommended in the case of accidental actions.
The accidental actions to be considered depend on:
• the measures taken to prevent or reduce the severity of an accidental action,
• the probability of occurrence of the identified accidental action,
• the consequences of failure due to the identified accidental action,
• public perception,
• the level of acceptable risk.
A localised failure due to accidental actions may be acceptable, provided it will
not endanger the stability of the whole structure, and that the overall load bearing
capacity of the structure is maintained and allows necessary emergency measures to
be taken.
Measures should be taken to reduce the risk of accidental actions and these
measures should include one of more of the following strategies: preventing the
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action from occurring, protecting the structure against the effects of an accidental
action by reducing the effects of the action on the structure, ensuring that the
structure has sufficient robustness.
3.2.2. Horizontal ties
For framed structures, continuous internal ties, including their end connections,
should be capable of resisting a design tensile load of a value
Ti = 0.8(gk + ψqk)sL or 75 kN whatever is greater (3.6)
similarly for perimeter ties a design tensile force is given as
Tp = 0.4(gk + ψqk)sL or 75 kN whatever is greater (3.7)
where:
s – the spacing of ties,
L – the span of the tie,
ψ – the relevant factor in the expression for combination of action effects for the
accidental design situation (as in Eq. (3.5)).
For load-bearing walls, how the ties should be incorporated into the building
depends on the consequences class. For CC 2 buildings (Lower Risk Group), ade-
quate robustness is provided by adopting a cellular form of construction designed to
facilitate interaction of all components including an appropriate means of anchoring
the floor to the walls. For CC 2 buildings (Upper Risk Group), continuous horizon-
tal ties should be provided in the floors. These should be internal ties distributed
throughout the floors in both orthogonal directions and peripheral ties extending
around the perimeter of the floor slabs within 1.2m width of the slab. The design
tensile forces in the ties should be calculated as follows:
• for internal ties
Ti =
Ft(gk + ψqk)
7.5
·
z
5
or Ti = Ft whatever is greater, (3.8)
• for peripheral ties
Tp = Ft, (3.9)
where:
Ft – 60 kN/m or 20 + 4ns [kN/m], whichever is less,
ns – number of storeys,
z – smaller value of: 5 · H or the greatest distance [m] in the direction of
the tie, between the centers of the columns or other vertical load-bearing
members whether the distance is spanned by a single slab or by a system
of beams and slabs,
H – clear storey height.
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3.2.3. Vertical ties
All vertical ties (for frame and wall structures) should be continuous from the
foundations to the roof level.
For frame structures, vertical ties should be capable to resist an accidental design
tensile force equal to the largest design vertical permanent and variable load reaction
applied to the column from any one storey. It should be noted that this accidental
design loading should not act simultaneously with permanent and variable actions
that may be acting on the structure.
For wall structures, vertical ties may be deemed effective if:
a) for masonry walls their thickness is at least 150mm and if they have minimum
compressive strength of 5N/mm2 (see EN 1996 [33]),
b) the clear height of the wall, measured in meters between faces of floors or roof
does not exceed 20t, where t is the thickness of the wall in meters,
c) if vertical ties resist the following force
T =
34A
8000
(
H
t
)2
or 100 kN/m of wall, whichever is greater, (3.10)
where A – the cross-sectional area in mm2 of the wall measured on plan, excluding
the non load bearing leaf of a cavity wall;
d) the vertical ties are grouped at 5m maximum centres along the wall and occur
no greater than 2.5m from an unrestrained end of the wall.
3.2.4. Key elements
For building structures, a key element should resist an accidental design action
of Ad applied in horizontal and vertical directions (one direction at a time). Such
accidental design loading should be applied in accordance with expression (6.11b of
the EN 1990 [26], here see Eq. (3.5)) and may be concentrated or distributed load.
The recommended value of Ad for building structures is 34 kN/m
2.
3.2.5. Risk assessment
For category CC3 of buildings, Eurocode EN 1991-1-7 [28] requires a risk as-
sessment for a building. Risk is defined as a measure of the combination of the
probability or frequency of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the
consequences of the occurrence and is expressed as
R =
NH∑
i=1
p(Hi)
ND∑
j
NS∑
k=1
p(Dj|Hi) · p(Sk|Dj) · C(Sk), (3.11)
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where NH – number of different hazards, ND – number of ways the hazards may
damage the structure, NS – number of adverse states (Sk) into which the damage
structure can be discretised, C(Sk) – consequences of an adverse state, P (Hi) – prob-
ability of occurrence (within a reference time interval) of the i-th hazard, p(Dj|Hi)
– the conditional probability of the j-th damage state of the structure given the
i-th hazard and p(Sk|Dj) – the conditional probability of the k-th adverse overall
structural performance S given j-th damage state.
Analysing Eq. (3.11) there are the following possible strategies to control and
mitigate the risk:
• reduction of the probability that a hazard occur (reduction of P (H)). For ex-
ample if there is a risk that a ship impacts a bridge pier, creation of artificial
islands around the bridge pier will mitigate the risk.
• reduction of the probability of significant damages for given hazards (reduction
of P (D|H)).
• reduction of the probability of adverse structural performance given structural
damage (reduction of P (S|H)).
Thus, risk analysis of structures subject to accidental actions involves the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Assessment of the probability of occurrence of different hazards with their inten-
sities.
2. Assessment of the probability of different states of damage and corresponding
consequences for given hazards.
3. Assessment of the probability of inadequate performance of the damaged struc-
ture together with corresponding consequences.
3.2.6. Dynamic design against impact
Annex C of the EN 1991-1-7 [28] gives guidance for the approximate dynamic
design of structures to accidental impact by road vehicles, rail vehicles and ships
based on simplified or empirical models.
First, the general impact dynamics theory is considered, where impacts are ide-
alised and grouped into two types, namely hard impacts (the energy is dissipated by
the impacting object) and soft impacts (the structure absorbs the impact energy by
structure’s deformation). For hard impacts, EN 1991-1-7 formulates an expression
for the maximum resulting dynamic interaction force (F ) in function of the object
velocity at impact (vr), the equivalent elastic stiffness of the object (k) and the mass
of the impacting object (m). This maximum dynamic interaction force is for the
outer surface of the structure, while for the structure itself the dynamic effects can
be greater and should be included by applying the dynamic amplification factor.
For soft impacts, the same formula for the maximum dynamic interaction force can
be used, however for k, the stiffness of the structure should be taken. There is also
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formulated a provision that the structure should have sufficient ductility to be able
to absorb the total kinetic energy by plastic deformation.
The second part of the Annex C of the EN 1991-1-7 is devoted to specific pro-
visions for impacts by road vehicles and ships giving formulas or values for the
velocities of impact (vr) and approximate design values for the dynamic interaction
forces (Fd) depending on different factors such as: where the vehicles travel, the
mass of the vehicles, distance of vehicles from the road lanes, size and mass of ships,
whether the ships travel on inland or sea waterways etc.
3.2.7. Internal explosions
Annex D of the EN 1991-1-7 [28] provides guidance on how to deal with:
• dust explosions in rooms, vessels and bunkers,
• natural gas explosions,
• explosions in road and rail tunnels.
For dust explosions in rooms, vessels and bunkers, the EN 1991-1-7 gives:
• material parameters KSt (which characterise the confined explosion behaviour)
for most common types of dust and,
• a formula for the venting area of cubic, elongated rooms, vessels and bunkers, as
well as for rectangular enclosures.
For natural gas explosions, EN 1991-1-7 gives formulae for a nominal equivalent
static pressure as the loading a structure should withstand.
For explosions in road and rail tunnels, EN 1991-1-7 provides expressions for the
pressure time function in the cases of detonation and deflagration (see Chapter 2).
3.3. ASCE 7-05
The American Society of Civil Engineers, ASCE 7 [5] discusses general design
specifications for reducing the potential of progressive collapse, however, no specific
requirements are given. Similarly no U.S. building codes provide specific design
requirements with regard to progressive collapse.
The commentary to the ASCE 7 [5] provides detailed discussion on general struc-
tural integrity. It gives a list of possible methods for progressive collapse design such
as direct and indirect design approaches. Direct design approaches includes alter-
nate load path method and specific local resistance method, whereas indirect design
approach is based on implicit consideration of progressive collapse resistance by
ensuring minimum levels of strength, continuity and ductility. Similarly to the Eu-
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rocodes and British Standards, there is no provision on what dynamic amplification
factor should be used when equivalent static methods are used.
3.3.1. Load combinations
ASCE 7 [5] specifies the following load combinations:
• for specific local resistance method
1.2D + Ak + (0.5L or 0.2S) or (3.12)
(0.9 or 1.2)D + Ak + 0.2Wn, (3.13)
• for alternate load path method (checking if residual load-carrying capacity upon
notional removal of a selected load-bearing element)
(0.9 or 1.2)D + (0.5L or 0.2S) + 0.2Wn, (3.14)
where:
D – dead load,
L – live load,
Wn – wind load,
S – snow load,
Ak – load effect resulting from an extraordinary event to be specified by the au-
thority having jurisdiction.
3.4. GSA Guidelines
The US General Services Administration (GSA) Guidelines [40] do not mention
anything about designing key elements or designing based on tie forces.
GSA Guidelines permit to perform both linear and nonlinear analysis techniques,
however the latter is regarded as much more difficult and can only be performed
by experienced structural analyst with advanced structural engineering knowledge.
There is only one paragraph devoted to nonlinear procedure with general remarks
and no detailed guidance. However acceptance criteria for nonlinear analysis are
given.
GSA Guidelines provide minimum defended stand-off distances for different types
of construction (reinforced concrete, steel, masonry, precast, wood) depending on
required level of protections.
GSA Guidelines [40] use a flow-chart methodology to determine if a designed
building should have additional resistance for progressive collapse or can be exempt
from the process of progressive collapse design. The exemption is based on certain
criteria such as building occupancy, building category (reinforced concrete building,
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steel frame building etc.), number of storeys, seismic zone, local structural features
and global structural features. Whether positive or negative the answer is, the
building is exempt or not, from further consideration of the potential for progres-
sive collapse. The purpose of the detailed analysis is to reduce the probability of
progressive collapse for new construction and identify the potential for progressive
collapse in existing construction.
GSA Guidelines state that low and medium rise buildings can be designed accord-
ing to the simplified analysis procedure (linear procedure) while other building (more
than 10 storeys and with atypical structural configuration) should use a nonlinear
procedure.
GSA Guidelines give only general considerations for nonlinear procedure anal-
ysis with acceptance criteria for reinforced concrete and steel structures while two
separate chapters are devoted to linear procedures of reinforced concrete and steel
structures.
There are also presented detailed information on design and analysis of reinforced
concrete and steel structures. This includes guidance on how to design, model and
analyse the structures.
3.4.1. Design guidance
For reinforced concrete structures special attention should be paid to structural
redundancy, detailing to provide structural continuity and ductility, capacity for
resisting load reversals and capacity for preventing shear failure.
Structural redundancy using redundant vertical and lateral force resisting sys-
tems enables developing alternate load paths and forming multiple plastic hinges
which can help to prevent total collapse.
When a vertical load-bearing member is missing it is important that main struc-
tural elements are capable to carry two spans. This implies good beam-to-beam
continuity across removed element and the ability of structural elements to develop
large deformations.
The capacity for resisting load reversals should be achieved in such a way that
structural members (girders, beams) have additional reinforcement in the zones of
compressed fibres since, for instance, after removing a column, the previous negative
moment above the column transforms into a positive moment.
For steel structures, the guidelines emphasise such aspects as beam-to-beam
continuity, connection resilience, connection redundancy, connection rotational ca-
pacity.
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3.4.2. Analysis techniques
The analysis techniques presented in GSA Guidelines should mainly use linear
elastic, static analysis preferably on a 3 dimensional models and consist of:
• removing a vertical load-bearing member instantaneously and
• applying load combinations multiplied by the factor of 2 accounting for the dy-
namic and nonlinear effects (see 3.4.3 for more details).
3.4.3. Load combinations
The structure should be analysed using the following load combinations applied
to the whole structure together with an instantaneous loss of primary vertical sup-
port
2(D + 0.25L) static analysis, (3.15)
D + 0.25L dynamic analysis, (3.16)
where: D - dead load, L - live load.
For frame structures a column removal should be analysed for one floor above
ground. The exterior locations of columns to be removed include:
• the middle of the short side of the building,
• the middle of the long side of the building,
• the corner of the building.
If there is an underground parking area or uncontrolled public ground floor, the
column to be removed should be interior to the perimeter column lines.
For wall structures the considered part of removed load-bearing wall include one
structural bay or 30 ft of an exterior wall section (whichever is less) located at:
• the middle of the short side of the building,
• the middle of the long side of the building,
• the corner of the building.
Again if there is an underground parking area or uncontrolled public ground floor,
the instantaneously removed section should be one bay or 30ft of an interior wall
section (whichever is less) close to the perimeter of the bearing wall line.
The removal of the vertical element for dynamic analysis should be instantaneous
and in any case the removal time should not exceed 1/10 of the period corresponding
to the structural response mode for the vertical element removal.
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3.4.4. Analysis criteria
The maximum allowable size of damage caused by the instantaneous removal
of a primary exterior vertical member shall be limited to the structural bays di-
rectly associated with the instantaneously removed or 1800 ft2 (167m2) at the floor
level directly above the instantaneously removed vertical member (whichever is the
smaller area).
In the case of the instantaneous removal of a primary interior vertical member
the corresponding allowable extend of damage should be limited to the structural
bays directly associated with the instantaneously removed or 3600 ft2 (334m2) at the
floor level directly above the instantaneously removed vertical member (whichever
is the smaller area).
The same above requirements are applicable for reinforced concrete and steel
structures.
3.4.5. Acceptance criteria
Satisfying acceptance criteria for linear static analysis consist in obtaining
the actual internal forces caused by load combinations in an analysed structure
and compare them with member capacities. To this end, an indicator DCR
(Demand-Capacity Ratio) is defined by
DCR =
QUD
QCE
(3.17)
where:
QCE – expected ultimate, unfactored capacity,
QUD – acting force (demand) in structural member or joint (bending moment,
shear or axial force).
For reinforced concrete structures allowable DCR values are as follows: DCR ≤
2.0 for typical structural configurations and DCR ≤ 1.5 for atypical structural config-
urations. For steel structures allowable DCR values depend on section compactness1
and are in the range (1.0–3.0) for typical structural configurations. The criteria for
atypical structural configurations are multiplied by 0.75, but not less than 1.0.
Acceptance criteria for nonlinear analysis in terms of ductility and rotation limits
are defined in table 2.1 of GSA Guidelines. The table gives values in terms of
rotations and ductility for reinforced concrete, steel, unreinforced and reinforced
masonry as well as for wood structures. Fig. 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate how to define
rotations in beams and frames.
1 flange compactness bf/(2tf ), web compactness h/tw, where: bf is the width of the com-
pressed flange, tf is the thickness of the compressed flange, h is the height of the section and tw is
the thickness of the web.
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Figure 3.3. Sideways and member end rotations (θ) for frames (from GSA Guidelines
[40])
3.5. UFC 4-023-03
The US Department of Defence, Unified Facilities Criteria, DoD UFC Guidelines
[20] give the design requirements to mitigate the potential of progressive collapse for
new and existing DoD facilities and this guidelines follow other documents of DoD
such as DoD UFC 4-010-01 [18], DoD UFC 4-010-02 [19].
DoD UFC Guidelines [20] provide progressive collapse design procedures of two
different levels. The first level of progressive collapse uses the provision of tie forces
which are based on a catenary response of the structure, while the second level refers
to the alternate load path method, in which the building must bridge over a removed
element.
However unlike many other documents, DoD UFC Guidelines [20] do not say
anything about key elements. The guidelines say that even though other design
method for identified and specific threat is used, the progressive collapse require-
ments of these guidelines still must be met.
The applied level of progressive collapse design is related to the level of protection
which must be delivered to the designer by the project planning team. DoD UFC
Guidelines specify fours level of protection and assigns appropriate progressive col-
lapse design procedures. For Very Low Level of Protection (VLLOP) and Low Level
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of Protection (LLOP) only indirect design is required, by satisfying given levels of
tie forces. However, when this condition cannot be satisfied, then the alternate load
path method must be used. For Medium Level of Protection (MLOP) and High
Level of Protection (HLOP), the alternate load path method should be applied in
addition to the tie force method. Moreover for MLOP and HLOP additional duc-
tility requirements should be met for ground floor perimeter vertical load-bearing
elements.
According to DoD UFC Guidelines the majority of new and existing DoD struc-
tures will fall into the group of VLLOP and LLOP. Thus only tie force method will
be used, whose criteria in the majority of the cases will be met without difficulty.
3.5.1. Load combinations
DoD UFC Guidelines [20] define the load combinations indicated below.
For static analyses, to account for dynamic effects regarding the removal of
a load-bearing element, the dynamic amplification factor is equal to 2 and the appro-
priate load combinations applied only to the elements of bays related to the removed
element and for all storeys of that bays are as follows
2(1.2D + 0.5L+ 0.2W ) (3.18)
2(1.2D + 0.2S + 0.2W ) (3.19)
For other structural elements in the static analyses, the load combinations are
1.2D + 0.5L+ 0.2W (3.20)
1.2D + 0.2S + 0.2W (3.21)
where:
D – dead load,
L – live load,
W – wind load,
S – snow load.
For dynamic analyses, the load combinations presented above in Eq. (3.20) or
(3.21) should be used.
3.5.2. Linear Static Analysis Procedure
In a Linear Static Analysis, the following steps are performed. it should be noted
that a second order or P-∆ analysis is required.
1. For alternate path analyses for load-bearing elements that do not have adequate
vertical tie force capacity, remove the element from the structural model in ac-
cordance with the material-specific requirements. For alternate path analyses of
MLOP and HLOP structures, remove the column or load-bearing wall.
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2. Apply the loads.
3. After the analysis is performed, compare the predicted element and connec-
tion forces and deformations against the acceptability criteria that are shown
generically in Table 3-1 of UFC 4-023-03. To demonstrate compliance with the
acceptability criteria, a software package with modules that perform building
code checks may be used, providing the modules can be tailored to check the cri-
teria in Table 3-1. Confirm that all material-specific code provisions for bracing,
compactness, flexural-axial interaction, etc., are met.
4. If none of the structural elements or connections violates the acceptability cri-
teria, the analysis is complete and satisfactory resistance to progressive collapse
has been demonstrated. If any of the structural elements or connections violate
the acceptability criteria, perform the following procedure:
a) Modify the geometry or material properties of the model, (i.e., remove ele-
ments and/or insert hinges and constant moments).
b) If an element was shown to fail, redistribute the element’s loads.
c) Re-analyse this modified model and applied loading, starting from the un-
loaded/undeformed condition.
d) At the end of the re-analysis, assess the resulting damaged state and com-
pare with the damage limits. If the damage limits are violated, re-design
and re-analyse the structure, starting with Step 1. If the damage limits are
not violated, compare the resulting internal forces and deformation of each
element and connection with the acceptability criteria
e) If any of the acceptability criteria are violated in the new analysis, repeat this
process (steps (a) through (e)), until the damage limits are violated or there
are no more violations of the acceptability criteria. If the damage limits are
violated, re-design and reanalyse the structure, starting with Step 1. If the
damage limits are not violated and no new elements failed the acceptability
criteria, then the design is adequate
3.5.3. Nonlinear Static Analysis Procedure
In a Nonlinear Static Analysis, the following steps are performed.
1. For alternate path analyses for load-bearing elements that do not have adequate
vertical tie force capacity, remove the element from the structural model in ac-
cordance with the material-specific requirements. For alternate path analyses of
MLOP and HLOP structures, remove the column or load- bearing wall.
2. Apply the loads using a load history that starts at zero and is increased to the
final values. Apply at least 10 load steps to reach the total load. The software
must be capable of incrementally increasing the load and iteratively reaching
convergence before proceeding to the next load increment.
3. As the analysis is performed, compare the predicted element and connection
forces and deformations against the acceptability criteria that are shown gener-
ically in Table 3-1 of UFC 4-023-03. To demonstrate compliance with the ac-
ceptability criteria, a software package with modules that perform building code
checks may be used, providing the modules can be tailored to check the crite-
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ria in Table 3-1. Confirm that all material-specific code provisions for bracing,
compactness, flexural-axial interaction, etc., are met.
4. If none of the structural elements or connections violates the acceptability criteria
during the loading process, the analysis is complete and satisfactory resistance to
progressive collapse has been demonstrated. If any of the structural elements or
connections violate the acceptability criteria, perform the following procedure:
a) At the point in the load history when the element or connection fails the
acceptability criteria, remove the element or connection.
b) If an element was shown to fail, redistribute the element’s loads.
c) Restart the analysis from the point in the load history at which the element
or connection failed and the model was modified. Increase the load until the
maximum load is reached or until another element or connection violates the
acceptability criteria.
d) At each point at which the analysis is halted, check the predicted damage
state against the damage limits. If the damage limits are violated, re-design
and re-analyse the structure, starting with Step 1.
e) If the damage limits are not violated and the total load has been applied,
the design is adequate. If the damage limits are not violated but one of
the acceptability criteria was violated in the re-started analysis, repeat this
process (Steps (a) through (e)), until the total load is applied or the damage
limits are violated.
3.5.4. Nonlinear Dynamic Analysis Procedure
In a Nonlinear Dynamic Analysis, the following steps are performed:
1. Distribute the mass of the structure throughout the model in a realistic man-
ner; lumped masses are not allowed, unless to represent mechanical equipment,
pumps, architectural features, and similar items. Distribute mass along beams
and column as mass per unit length; for slabs and floors, represent the mass
as mass per unit area. If any portion of the structure is represented by solid
elements, distribute the mass as mass per unit volume.
2. Prior to the removal of the load-bearing element, bring the model to static equi-
librium under the loads; the process for reaching equilibrium under gravity loads
will vary with analysis technique.
3. With the model stabilised, remove the appropriate load-bearing element instan-
taneously. For alternate path analyses for load-bearing elements that do not
have adequate vertical tie force capacity, remove the element in accordance with
the material-specific requirements. For alternate path analyses of MLOP and
HLOP structures, remove the column or load-bearing wall.
4. Continue the dynamic analysis until the structure reaches a steady and stable
condition (i.e., the displacement history of the model reaches a near constant
value, with very small oscillations and all material and geometric nonlinear pro-
cesses have halted).
5. During or after the analysis, compare the predicted element and connection forces
and deformations against the acceptability criteria that are shown generically in
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Table 3-1 of UFC 4-023-03. To demonstrate compliance with the acceptability
criteria, a software package with modules that perform building code checks may
be used, providing the modules can be tailored to check the criteria in Table
3-1. Confirm that all material-specific code provisions for bracing, compactness,
flexural-axial interaction, etc, are met.
6. If none of the structural elements or connections violates the acceptability cri-
teria during the dynamic motion of the structure, the analysis is complete and
satisfactory resistance to progressive collapse has been demonstrated. If any of
the structural elements or connections violate the acceptability criteria, perform
the following procedure:
a) At the point in the load history when the element or connection fails the
acceptability criteria, instantaneously remove the element or connection from
the model.
b) If an element was shown to fail, redistribute the element’s loads.
c) Restart the analysis from the point in the load history at which the element
or connection failed and the model was modified. Continue the analysis until
the structural model stabilises or until another element or connection violates
the acceptability criteria.
d) For each time at which the analysis is halted due to violation of an element
acceptability criteria, check the damage limits. If the damage limits are
violated, stop the analysis and re-design and re-analyse the structure, starting
with Step 1.
e) If the damage limits are not violated and the structural model stabilises,
the design is adequate. If the damage limits are not violated but one of
the acceptability criteria was violated in the re-started analysis, repeat this
process (Steps A through E) until the structure reaches a stable condition or
the damage limits are violated.
Figure 3.4. Tie forces in a frame structure (UFC 4-023-03)
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3.5.5. Internal ties
Specific formulas for internal tie forces are given for different types of structures
as follows:
a) reinforced concrete
Ti =
1.0D + 1.0L
7.5
lr
5
Ft or Ti = 1.0Ft (3.22)
where:
D – dead load,
L – live load,
lr – greater of the distances between the centres of the columns, frames or walls
supporting any two adjacent floor spaces in the direction of the tie under
consideration,
Ft – basic strength, lesser of (20 + 4no) or 60 kN,
no – number of storeys
b) steel structures
Ti = 0.5(1.2D + 1.6L)stLl but not less than 75 kN (3.23)
Ll - span, st - mean transverse spacing of the ties adjacent to the ties being
checked
c) masonry structures
Ti =
1.0D + 1.0L
7.5
La
5
Ft or Ti = 1.0Ft (3.24)
La - lesser of the greatest distance in the direction of the tie between the centres
of columns or the other vertical load-bearing members where this distance is
spanned by a single slab or by a system of beams and slabs or 5h (h - clear
storey height) Ft - basic strength, lesser of 20+ 4no or 60 no - number of storeys
including ground and basement
d) wood structures
Ti =
1.0D + 1.0L
3.1
lr
4.6
Ft or Ti = 1.0Ft (3.25)
lr - greater of the distances between the centres of the columns, frames or walls
supporting any two adjacent floor spaces in the direction of the tie under consid-
eration, Ft - basic strength, lesser of 7.3 + 1.46no or 21.9 no - number of storeys
e) cold-formed steel structures
Ti =
1.0D + 1.0L
3.1
lr
4.6
Ft or Ti = 1.0Ft (3.26)
lr - greater of the distances between the centres of the columns, frames or walls
supporting any two adjacent floor spaces in the direction of the tie under consid-
eration, Ft - basic strength, lesser of 7.3 + 1.46no or 21.9 no - number of storeys
Ft = min : (20 + 4n0) or 60 kN (3.27)
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3.5.6. Perimeter ties
Similarly, regulations for perimeter ties are defined for the following types of
structures:
a) reinforced concrete structures
At each floor and roof level, ensure a continuous tie of a design strength equal
to 1.0Ft located within 1.2m of building edges or within the perimeter wall.
Each external column and, if the peripheral tie is not located within the wall,
every meter length of external wall carrying vertical load must be anchored or
tied horizontally into the structure at each floor or roof level with a required
tensile strength equal to the greater of
• the lesser of 2.0Ft or (ls/2.5)Ft
• 3% of the largest factored vertical load, carried by the column or wall at that
level, due to conventional design load combinations
where ls is the floor to floor height.
b) steel structures
Tp = 0.25(1.2D + 1.6L)stLl but not less than 75 kN (3.28)
All columns must be continuous through each beam-to-column connection. All
column splices must provide a design tie strength equal to the largest factored ver-
tical dead and live load reaction (from all load combinations used in the design)
applied to the column at any single floor level located between that column splice
and the next column splice down or the base of the column.
3.5.7. Modelling of plastic hinges
For linear static analysis, if the calculated moment is greater than the nominal
moment strength and it is verified that the element is capable of forming a plastic
hinge, insert an equivalent plastic hinge into the model by inserting a discrete hinge
in the member at an offset from the member end and add two constant moments, one
at each side of the new hinge, in the appropriate direction for the acting moment.
The magnitude of the constant moments is equal to the determined plastic moment
capacity of the element. For the determination of the plastic hinge the guidelines
recommend engineering analysis and judgement or the guidance provided for seismic
connections in FEMA [38]. For nonlinear static and dynamic analysis, use software
capable of representing post-peak flexural behaviour and considering interaction
effects of axial loads and moment. Ensure that shear failure will not occur before
developing the full flexural design strength.
3.5.8. Updates from 2009 and 2010
DoD UFC Guidelines [21] has been updated two times, however the second
change is minor. The first update of the document resulted from the new test
data and analytical model for steel beam-to-column connections, wood structure
under blast damage and collapse loading, reinforced concrete slab response to large
deformations, as well as load and dynamic increase factors to account for inertia
force, nonlinear geometry and material behaviour. The other reasons for the update
concerned contradictions and ambiguities in terminology for structural concept and
guidance for linear static, nonlinear static, linear dynamic and nonlinear dynamic
methods. In particular, the following changes have been made:
• the levels of protection have been replaced by occupancy categories
• tie force method have been revised (including force values and locations of tie
forces),
• in Occupancy Category II, the alternate load path method can be used instead
of tie force method,
• modeling parameters and acceptance criteria have been adopted from ASCE 41
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• “m-factor” approach for Linear Static analysis has been implemented,
• load increase factors for linear static models and dynamic increase factors for
nonlinear static models have been included,
• the additional ductility requirements have been replaced with enhanced local
resistance
• the three example problems (reinforced concrete, steel, and wood) have been
revised according to the updated UFC 4-023-03.
4. Research papers on progressive collapse
There are already a few literature reviews concerning the problem of progressive
collapse, however each of them, being limited in the number of pages, summarises
only some aspects of progressive collapse. For example, Mohamed [53] and Nair [55]
provide a summary of several research papers on progressive collapse, give a short
comparison of codes and standards and present the well known examples of progres-
sive collapse.
4.1. Probability of progressive collapse
Ellingwood and Dusenberry [25] and Ellingwood [24] introduced a formula to
assess the probability of progressive collapse as follows
P (C) = P (C|DH) · P (D|H) · P (H) (4.1)
where:
P (C) – the probability of progressive collapse,
P (H) – the probability of the occurrence of a hazard H,
P (D|H) – the probability of local damage D as a result of a hazard H,
P (C|DH) – the probability of progressive collapse C of the structure as a result
of local damage D caused by hazard H.
Starossek and Haberland [69] gave a good illustration of this formula together with
assigned appropriate terms (see Fig. 4.1). Considering the above Eq. (4.1) and
Fig. 4.1, the probability of progressive collapse can be minimised in three ways,
namely by: controlling abnormal events, controlling local element behaviour and/or
controlling global system behaviour. Controlling abnormal events by structural
engineers is normally very difficult. However engineers can influence the local and
global system behaviour e.i. P (D|H) and P (C|DH).
}} } } }}robustness elementbehaviour eventcontrolcollapse resistance
vulnerability hazard
}
}
maximise
minimise
Figure 4.1. Terms in the context of progressive collapse (from [69])
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4.2. Inadequacy of current design methods for progressive
collapse resistance
According to Starossek [65], there is an inadequacy of current design methods
for progressive collapse resistance which can be summarised as follows:
• Current design codes are based on the consideration of local instead of global
failure. Global structural safety against the collapse of the entire system or a ma-
jor part of it is a function of the safety of all the elements against local failure.
Various types of structures can respond differently to local failure. Referring
to Eq. (4.1), the part P (C|DH) is not considered in the procedures of current
design standards.
• The second shortcoming of current design methods is that low-probability events
and unforeseeable incidents - i.e., events E for which P(E) is very small - are not
taken into account. Starossek argues that for a slender high-rise building, an
initial local failure is the simultaneous failure of all vertical load-bearing elements
of a storey, thus the probability of collapse is the sum of failure probability
of all elements. And if the number of storeys is large enough, even very low
probabilities of local failure resulting from accidental circumstances can sum up
to a probability of global failure large enough to be seriously considered.
• The third inadequacy of current design procedures lies in the fact that the prob-
abilistic concept requires the specification of acceptable failure probabilities. So
far the target failure probabilities of probabilistic design codes have been derived
from previous deterministic design codes. Taking into account that a potential
progressive collapse can entail huge losses, it would be difficult to reach consensus
from the society on acceptable value for the probability of progressive collapse.
It seems that this problem can be omitted by not undergoing this question to
the public opinion.
4.3. Examples of applying different strategies of progressive
collapse design
Starossek and Wolff [70] give a concise overview of direct design strategies for
progressive collapse using a simplified model of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Build-
ing (see Fig. 4.2). In the specific local resistance method a local damage is not
allowed so critical load-bearing elements must be designed to resist a prescribed
level of loading. This can be illustrated in Fig. 4.3 where columns of the lowest
storey are designed to resist specific accidental action (blast loading, car collision
etc.). Other ways to prevent local failure are to provide minimum stand-off distance
(see for example DoD UFC 4-010-02 [19]) by special barriers preventing load-bearing
elements of a structure from vehicle impacts or control of public access (see Fig. 4.4).
On the other hand, in the alternate load path method, some local damage is
allowed but then the structure must be designed in such a way that a new load path
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Figure 4.2. Initial frame structure
Figure 4.3. Specific local resistance
could be developed to bridge over the missing load-bearing member(s) (see Fig. 4.5).
Using one of the alternate load path methods can result in either modification of
the initial structural system, for example, by designing more load-bearing elements
(columns) as illustrated in Fig. 4.6 or strengthening the transfer girders as shown
in Fig. 4.7
In another paper, Starossek [67] considers complex progressive collapse strate-
gies which can be applied to tall buildings. These strategies include: nonstructural
protective measures, specific local resistance, alternative paths, isolation of collaps-
ing sections and prescriptive design rules. For specific local resistance approach,
Starossek proposes that a primary load transfer system being a key element could
take the form of a massive tube as illustrated in Fig. 4.8. The tube core should
constitute a high-strength reinforced concrete wall or a steel shape embedded in re-
inforced concrete with the wall thickness of the order of 1m or more. As seen in this
Figure, the tube core should not be situated on the outer perimeter of the building,
because any openings in the core should be limited to the minimum. There are also
Figure 4.4. Protective barriers
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Figure 4.5. Column failure
Figure 4.6. Modification of structural system - more columns
other features which the tube core should possesses that are described thoroughly in
the paper. In addition to the primary load transfer system there is envisaged a sec-
ondary load transfer system in a form of cantilever floors fixed to the core. These
cantilever floors, on the other hand, should be designed according to the alternate
load path method, and any local failure should not lead to the partial collapse.
Allowable damage scenarios of the secondary load transfer system are presented
in Fig. 4.9. It should be noted that an adequate rotational ductility capacity of
the plastic hinges should be ensured. Starossek states that the required rotational
ductility capacity is difficult to be achieved in reinforced concrete beams and instead,
haunched steel girders can be used. Other way to limit the consequences of a local
failure is to design segmentation of the secondary load transfer system by means of
joints as illustrated in Fig. 4.10. Concerning the alternate load paths approach for
the primary load transfer system, Starossek concludes that it is almost impossible
to achieve for tall buildings nowadays, giving the example of the total collapse of
the WTC towers. On the other hand, using vertical segmentation approach, there
are chances that an initial local failure can be arrested. An example of such vertical
Figure 4.7. Strengthening of transfer girders
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Figure 4.8. Primary load transfer system: a) elevation and rectangular cross-section, b)
circular cross section (from Starossek [67])
Figure 4.9. Assumed damage and admissible deformation in secondary load transfer
system: a) assuming the impact of one floor on another floor below, b) assuming the
impact of two floors on another two floors below (from Starossek [67])
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Figure 4.10. Segmentation of secondary load transfer system by joints (from Starossek
[67])
segmentation in a tall building is given in Fig. 4.11. The height of a segment should
be of the order of one tenth of the building height. It is assumed that in the case
of a local failure of one or more floors, the failure front progresses vertically in two
directions (upward and downward) of segment borders. Simultaneously, the upper
part of the building, above the failing segment, moves down as a rigid body. The
largest forces occur when the upper part together with the falling debris impacts
the lower segment. First solution could be to design thick reinforced or prestressed
concrete slabs. The other more advanced solution would comprise two slabs having
shock-absorbing devices in between (see Fig. 4.11). These envisaged shock-absorbing
devices could consist of telescoping large diameter steel tubes filled with a material
which enables high compressive strain, for example using scrap metal or porous tuff
gravel (see Fig. 4.11c). Regarding the prescriptive design rules for tall building,
Starossek advises against using them since for such large and expensive structures
general rules without performance-based analysis can enhance the continuity, duc-
tility and catenary actions in a quantitative way but not in a qualitative one.
DeStefano [17] as a practitioning engineer gives recommendations on how to
provide adequate detailing to prevent progressive collapse without excessive costs.
He takes advantage of the fundamental principle of catenary behaviour which can be
developed when structural elements originally designed to resist loads in flexure are
subjected to large displacements which in turn causes to develop axial forces in those
structural elements. For instance when an exterior column is removed from the lower
floor of the structure, the ring girders act in tension. However, the weakest point in
this consideration is the corner of the building. The author of the paper provides
a simple solution by applying diagonal girder in each corner span. There are also
given four tips on how to design the structure to allow for catenary behaviour. These
are: (1) orientation of girders in such a way that the heaviest members are on the
perimeter, (2) introduction of diagonal girders in the corner spans, (3) orientation
of wide-flange perimeter columns with their strong axis parallel to the exterior wall.
This allows the girders to connect directly to the column flange, (4) use of ductile
girder connection to the columns to allow rotations and to resist large axial loads.
Seat and one-sided connections should be avoided.
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Figure 4.11. Segmentation strategy: (a) overall view of a building with vertical segmen-
tation, (b) detail of the shock-absorbing segment, (c) shock-absorbing device: telescoping
steel tubes with compressible filling (from Starossek [67])
Another interesting example of progressive collapse design given in the same
paper by Starossek and Wolff [70] is the approach in the case of the Confederation
Bridge in Canada. Designing this kind of bridge in a robust way appeared not to
be feasible, so the actual approach for progressive collapse was to spatially limit
potential local failure by isolating the collapsing section. Avoiding potential total
collapse of the bridge required an interruption of continuity of prestressed tendons.
An interesting case of removing columns experimentally in an existing building
was presented by Sasani and Sagiroglu [62]. The building was the 6-storey Hotel
San Diego, San Diego, U.S., planned to be demolished. The height of the first floor
was about 6m, while the height of the other floors and the last floor were 3.2m
and 5.13m, respectively. The structural system constituted a non-ductile reinforced
concrete frame structure with exterior infill walls. The floor system consisted of
one-way joists. Before the experiment, all nonstructural elements, infrastructure
and furniture as well as the infill walls of the first and the third floor were removed
deliberately. The plan, south-east view and a 3D model of the Hotel is in Fig. 4.12,
4.13 and 4.14.
To evaluate progressive collapse resistance of the building, two columns of the
first floor (including a corner column) were exploded by implosion. The explo-
sives were placed in drilled holes in the columns and the columns were wrapped
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Figure 4.12. South-east view of the Hotel San Diego (from Sasani and Sagiroglu [62])
Figure 4.13. Typical plan of the Hotel San Diego (removed columns in circles) [62]
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Figure 4.14. 3D model of the Hotel San Diego (from Sasani and Sagiroglu [62])
by protective materials what prevented from air-blast shock waves. The structure
was equipped with strain gauges and potentiometers to measure global and local
deformations in time. The actual sudden removal of the two columns didn’t cause
any collapse of the frame. The maximum and the permanent vertical displacements
at points above the removed columns were around 6.1mm, which means that the
beam above the removed columns deflected as a rigid body without deformations.
On the other hand, the beams A1-A2 and A3-B3 deformed more significantly with
rotations illustrated in Fig. 4.15. The reproduced deformed shape of the frame
based on measurements is shown in Fig. 4.16. It is interesting to note that beams
A1-A2 and B3-A3 exhibits double curvature which accounts for the development of
Vierendeel frame action in both directions (see also Fig. 4.16)
Abruzzo et al. [1] report the application of progressive collapse procedures to
assess an existing reinforced concrete commercial building. The applied progressive
collapse procedures were: ACI 318 [2] structural integrity requirements, tie force
approach based on DoD UFC Guidelines [20], linear static method based on GSA
Guidelines [40] and nonlinear static analysis based on DoD UFC Guidelines [20]
(using SAP2000). The authors state that the structure would be prone to progressive
collapse when one of the interior columns loses capacity to carry loads. In particular,
prescriptive requirement such as those in ACI 318 [2] and DoD UFC Guidelines [20]
would not guarantee the prevention of progressive collapse.
4.4. Types of progressive collapses
Starossek [66] in his paper presents six different types and four classes of progres-
sive collapse mechanisms. Those mechanisms are described by their characteristic
features and then are compared. The motivation for this typology and classifica-
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Figure 4.15. Deformed shape of beams A1-A2 and A3-B3 (from Sasani and Sagiroglu
[62])
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Figure 4.16. Reproduced deformed shape after columns removal based on measurements
(from Sasani and Sagiroglu [62])
tion is that although the progressive collapse is understood as failure of the whole
system due to a disproportionately small local failure, the final collapse state can
be produced in various ways. The author of this paper states that little progress in
developing analysis procedures, quantifying indices (e.g. such as robustness indices)
and developing, classifying and choosing countermeasures might have been achieved
due to the lack of differentiation and classification of progressive collapse types.
Below the list of types of progressive collapse with their main features is presented,
followed by the classification and proposed terminology:
1. Pancake-type collapse.
A pancake-type collapse is characterised by the following features:
• initial failure of load-bearing members;
• partial or complete separation and fall of components, in a vertical rigid-body
motion;
• transformation of potential energy into kinetic energy;
• impact of separated and falling structural components on the remaining struc-
ture;
• failure of the vertical load-bearing elements due to the impact loading;
• collapse progression in the vertical direction.
Example: the collapse of World Trade Center towers.
2. Zipper-type collapse.
A zipper-type collapse is characterised by the following features:
• initial failure of one or a few structural elements
• redistribution of forces carried by these elements in the remaining structure
• impulsive loading due to the suddenness of the initial failure
• dynamic response of the remaining structure to that impulsive loading
• due to the combined static and dynamic effects, a force concentration in and
failure of elements which are similar in type and function to and adjacent to
or in the vicinity of the initially failing elements
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• collapse progression in a direction transverse to the principal forces in the
failing elements
Example: the collapse of Tacoma Narrows Bridge.
3. Domino-type collapse.
The list of features characterising a domino-type collapse is as follows:
• initial overturning of one element
• fall of that element in an angular rigid-body motion around a bottom edge
• transformation of potential energy into kinetic energy
• abrupt deceleration of the element’s motion through sudden activation of
discrete other elements; the horizontal force induced by that event is of both
static and dynamic origin because it results from both the tilting and the
motion of the decelerated element
• overturning of other elements due to the horizontal loading from the deceler-
ated element
• collapse progression in horizontal direction
4. Section-type collapse.
It can be described in the context of a beam in bending or a bar under axial
tension. When a cut occurs in a section of the beam, the internal forces must be
transmitted by the remaining cross-section. This type of collapse can not usually
be called a progressive collapse but fast fracture. However it is included in the
typology list to exploit similarities and analogies.
5. Instability-type collapse.
An instability-type collapse is characterised by the following features:
• initial failure of elements which stabilise load-carrying elements in compres-
sion
• instability of the elements in compression that cease to be stabilised
• sudden failure of these destabilised elements due to small perturbations
• failure progression
6. Mixed-type collapse. Other types of progressive collapse mechanisms which can-
not be easily distinguished and described and/or can be a combination of the
previous five types, fall in the mixed-type progressive collapse. As an example of
this type of progressive collapse, Starossek [66] gives the partial collapse of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building (Oklahoma City, 1995) and Haeng-Ju Grand
Bridge (Seoul, 1992).
Those types of progressive collapse can be further classified by their main features.
So zipper-type and section-type collapses can be grouped into the redistribution
class since the remaining structure must redistribute the forces of failed elements.
Pancake-type and domino-type collapses are characterised by the fact that the major
amount of potential energy is transformed into kinetic energy. So they can be
grouped into the impact class. At last, instability-type and mixed-type collapses
form their own classes having no common features.
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4.5. Simplified methods for progressive collapse analysis
Buscemi and Marjanishvili [13] present a simplified method for assessing the pre-
disposition of a structure to progressive collapse. The method is based on pendulum
analogy, reducing the problem to a dynamic analysis of a SDOF system with initial
conditions. The authors developed a modelling aid which can be used to determine
how a building is prone to progressive collapse based on maximum ductility and
corresponding rotations of major load-bearing elements.
Pujol and Smith-Pardo [59] present a simplified method for analysing frame
structures for progressive collapse when a column is instantaneously removed. The
purpose of the method is to provide a simple tool for preliminary design and consists
in evaluating a displacement ductility demand (ratio of displacement demand to yield
displacement – µ = ∆max/∆y) using load factors (ratio of yield resistance to applied
load – LF ). The authors conclude that a floor system will have enough progressive
collapse resistance when one or more supports are removed provided that: (1) the
strength of the floor system, after the removal of support(s), is greater than the
applied loads by more than 50% and (2) the displacement ductility capacity of the
floor system is greater than 1.5. For other ratios of yield resistance to applied load
(LF ), the chances of the floor system to survive depends on displacement ductility
demand (µ) which can be estimated using the following formula
µ =
1
2
·
LF
LF − 1
. (4.2)
Menchel [52] devoted his Ph.D. thesis to progressive collapse. The main contribu-
tion is the development of two new quasi-static procedures accounting for dynamic
inertial effects more accurately. The first new pushover analysis procedure is based
on a kinetic energy criterion (similar approach can also be found in Izzuddin et al.
[43] and Dusenberry and Hamburger [23]) and the second pushover analysis is based
on optimised load amplification factors. The validation of the procedures were per-
formed using dynamic nonlinear analyses. Another contribution is to use a more
complex fibre-based nonlinear beam element (instead of an elastic beam element
with discrete plastic hinges) to analyse reinforced concrete beams and columns.
Dusenberry and Hamburger [23] introduced a new energy based progressive col-
lapse analysis method which creates a bridge between present simplified analysis
methods and the best representation of the nonlinear dynamic behaviour that oc-
curs during collapse. The energy-based method tracks the energy released by falling
weight and energy absorbed by the structure, a comparison can be made to assess
if the failure is arrested. In other words, if the energy absorbed by the structure
exceeds the change in potential energy, the structure comes to rest and has potential
to survive.
Vlassis et al. [74] present a new design-oriented methodology for progressive
collapse assessment of multi-storey buildings subjected to impact from the above
failed floor. The idea is to assess if the lower floor is able to arrest the falling floor
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which depends on the amount of kinetic energy transmitted from the upper floor
during the impact.
Schmidt [63] provides a summary of the methods which enable to define an
external terrorist bomb threat, estimate structural design loads and analyse the
structure using a simple dynamic model. The effect of a blast is defined through
the parameter Z = R/W 0.333, where R is a stand-off distance and W is explosive
charge size. The stand-off distance measures how close to the structure, a bomb can
explode and therefore is related to the physical surroundings of the building. W is
a corresponding mass or weight of TNT. For other explosives, an adequate scaling
factor relating the heat energy of detonation to that of TNT must be provided.
As for blast loading, the shock wave caused by an external blast gives an almost
instantaneous increase in pressure on objects to a maximum value. After reaching
the maximum of the positive phase, the pressure decays and then for longer period
rests in negative phase. For structural analysis, this behaviour can be approximated
by a triangular impulse load with zero or very small rise time and longer linear
decay. The maximum reflected pressure (pr) and total reflected impulse (ir) of the
actual load in positive phase should be the basis for the equivalent loading, so the
design duration be td = 2ir/pr. The negative phase is neglected because it has little
effect on the maximum response of the structure.
4.6. Numerical case studies
Bao and Li [8] analysed the residual strength of reinforced concrete columns
under a short stand-off blast loading. A case studies were performed to evaluate the
effects of transverse reinforcement ratio, axial load ratio, longitudinal reinforcement
ratio and column aspect ratio using the explicit FEM software LS-DYNA. In the
paper the effects of strain rate on concrete and reinforcing steel were taken into
account. The numerical simulation of dynamic response revealed that:
• the same axial load ratio is more critical for columns with a low transverse
reinforcement ratio,
• the ratio of residual axial capacity increases with the longitudinal reinforcement
ratio,
• the residual axial capacity increases with the decrease of the column aspect ratio,
• seismic detailing techniques can significantly reduce the extent of direct blast
induced damage.
Agnew and Marjanishvili [4], Marjanishvili and Agnew [49], Marjanishvili [50]
present and compare four methods for progressive collapse analysis by analysing
a 9-storey steel moment-resistant frame building. The four methods are: linear
static, nonlinear static, linear dynamic and nonlinear dynamic methods. The last
paper gives detailed steps for performing all analyses in SAP 2000 including some
screenshots. Contrary to the GSA Guidelines and DoD UFC guidelines, where they
discourage to use nonlinear dynamic analysis, the authors of the papers state that
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using nonlinear dynamic analysis is not only more accurate but also easy to perform
by using modern FEM software.
Kaewkulchai and Williamson [44, 45] presented a nonlinear solution procedure
for progressive collapse analysis of planar frame structures. A proposal of a mod-
elling strategy to account for the impact of failed members against other structural
components is given. The authors indicate that the impact velocity plays the most
important role.
Ruth et al. [61] performed analyses which lead to conclusion that the dynamic
factors of 2 given in GSA Guidelines [40] and DoD UFC Guidelines [20] are too con-
servative. Comparison of an equivalent static nonlinear analysis with the dynamic
factor of 1.5 and the dynamic nonlinear analysis shows that enough safety is ensured
and more economic design can be achieved.
Powell [58] also confirms that the static analysis for progressive collapse is too
conservative, also stating that performing dynamic, nonlinear analysis using current
FEM software is no more difficult and gives better accuracy.
Hayes et al. [41] presents studies on how the current seismic design provisions can
improve resistance to blast loads and progressive collapse. The study was carried out
on Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building (severely damaged in 1995), where 3 seismic
strengthening techniques and then progressive collapse analysis were performed to
compare progressive collapse resistance of the building. The key finding of the
study was that strengthening the perimeter element using current seismic detailing
techniques improved the survivability of the building, while strengthening elements
internal to the building was not effective.
4.7. Measures of structural robustness and vulnerability
According to NIST Best Practices [56], structural robustness for reducing pro-
gressive collapse risk can be enhanced by incorporating sufficient: redundancy, ties,
ductility, adequate shear strength and capacity for resisting load reversals. Although
providing adequate level of these features will improve the robustness of the struc-
ture qualitatively, it would be convenient to use a quantitative way to measure and
compare the robustness of different structures.
Starossek and Haberland [68, 69] formulated four general conditions that mea-
sures of robustness should satisfy (if possible). These general conditions are:
• expressiveness: the measure should express all important aspects of robustness
and should give a clear difference between robust and non-robust structures;
• objectivity: the measure should be independent of decisions and same results
should be obtained for same conditions;
• simplicity: the measure should be as simple as possible;
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• calculability: the necessary parameters should be quantifiable and should be
obtainable from the data of the structure;
• generality: the measure should be possible to apply for different structures.
Different measures of robustness found in literature can be divided on those
based on structural behaviour and those based on structural attributes.
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4.7.1. Measures based on structural behaviour
Starossek and Haberland [68, 69] proposed three measure of robustness. Two
measures of robustness fall into this category of measures based on structural be-
haviour and the third one is based on structural attributes. The first measure of
robustness proposed by the authors is based on damage and defined as
Rd = 1−
p
plim
, (4.3)
where Rd – damage-based robustness measure, p – maximum extent of additional
damage (maximum damage progression) caused by the assumed initial damage ilim,
plim – acceptable damage progression. This measure takes into account design objec-
tives such as assumed initial damage and acceptable damage progression. Another
version of this measure of robustness can be expressed as
Rd,int = 1− 2
∫
1
0
[d(i)− i]di, (4.4)
where Rd,int – damage-based integral robustness measure, d(i) – maximum extent
of total damage caused by and including the initial damage i, based on the corre-
sponding value for the intact building, i – extent of initial damage also based on the
intact building.
The illustration of damage progression is shown in Fig. 4.17, where curve A rep-
resents a non-robust structure showing that even small initial damage can lead to
large global damage; curve B represents a robust structure – significant damage oc-
curs when large initial damage happens. However similar areas between the curves
B and C and line i (for integral in Eq. (4.4)) can be misleading in determining
a good robustness measure.
1
1i
d
d(i)
i
Figure 4.17. Damage evolution
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The second measure of robustness, based on energy, presented by Starossek and
Haberland [68, 69], can be defined as
Re = 1−max
j
Er,j
Es,k
, (4.5)
where Re – energy-based robustness measure, Er,j – energy released by the initial
failure of the structural element j and available for the damage of the next structural
element k, Es,k – energy required for the failure of the next structural element k.
Lind [46, 47] presents probabilistic definition of vulnerability and damage toler-
ance (robustness) and their related measures. The suggested definitions are intended
to be general and applicable to all engineering systems. To define vulnerability, Lind
denotes P (r, S) as the probability of failure of the system in a state r for prospective
loading S, r0 as a pristine system state and rd as a particular damaged state. Then
the vulnerability is defined as the ratio
V = V (rd, S) =
P (rd, S)
P (r0, S)
. (4.6)
This vulnerability is equal to one if the probability of failure is the same in the
damaged and undamaged states. The measure of damage tolerance is defined as the
reciprocal of the vulnerability (Eq. (4.6))
T =
P (r0, S)
P (rd, S)
. (4.7)
As the author states, to have realistic measure of vulnerability and damage tolerance,
one needs to assign realistic probability distributions for them.
Baker et al. [7] proposed a framework for assessment of robustness for systems
subject to structural damage. The idea of this framework is to create an event tree
as follows. Assume that a certain potentially damaging event (e.g. extreme values
of snow loads, explosions etc.) occurs in the system. The system can be damaged or
not. If no damage occurs, no further analysis is needed. If damage occurs, different
damage states can happen. For each damage states assign a probability of failure.
Assign also consequences for possible damage and failure scenarios. Direct conse-
quences are related to initial damage, whereas indirect consequences are related to
subsequent system failure. Consequences take multiple forms for example: incon-
venience to system users, injuries, fatalities and costs and require an introduction
of a scalar measure. Having assign all these values, the authors proposed an index
of robustness (which measures the fraction of the total system risk resulting from
direct consequences) as follows
IR =
RDir
RDir +RInd
, (4.8)
where RDir and RInd are direct and indirect risks, respectively. These risks are
calculated by multiplying the consequences of each possible event scenario by its
probability of occurrence and then integrating over all the random variables in the
event tree. There are in the paper some example calculations for idealised systems,
however as the authors state application for real system requires more work.
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Wisniewski et al. [75] report load-capacity evaluation of existing railway bridges
by robustness quantification. Bridge robustness is defined as the ability to carry
loads after the failure of one of its members. To express robustness of railway bridges,
the authors define so-called redundancy factor based on redundancy ratios which
compare the load-carrying capacity in the limit states to the design load-carrying
capacity. If the calculated redundancy factor is less than 1.0 then the bridge may
be deemed as not safe, for redundancy factor equal or greater than 1.0 the bridge
may be considered as safe.
Maes et al. [48] presented three measures of robustness. The first measure of
robustness is referred to the assumption that the system’s resistance as a whole can
be maintained to a sufficient degree after a load that makes failure in one of its
components i. This measure of robustness can be written as
R1 = min
i
RSRi
RSR0
, (4.9)
where RSRi is the reserve strength ratio when member i is impaired, while RSR0
is the reserve strength ratio when no member is impaired.
The second proposed measure of robustness can be expressed in terms of system
reliability as
R2 = min
i
Ps0
Psi
, (4.10)
where Ps0 is the system probability of failure of the undamaged system subject to
such a member design load and Psi is the system probability of failure when element
i is impaired.
The third measure of robustness is based on sample functions of failure conse-
quences versus hazard intensity and conditional probability of exceedance versus
failure consequences. Computing the inverse of the tail heaviness H of the men-
tioned conditional probability of exceedance versus failure consequences a measure
of robustness R3 can be obtained. According to Maes et al. [48], the tail of any
given probability distribution can be easily computed and if H is less than one, it
means that the robustness of a structure is very high, if H is one – the robustness
is smaller than before and for large H – the robustness of the structure is very low.
Smith [64] proposed a measure of robustness based on the theory of fast fracture
in fracture mechanics. The premise of this approach is as follows: if the energy
released by loss of a damaged member is greater than the energy absorbed by the
totally damaged member and other partially damaged members, then the progressive
collapse will occur. This approach uses finite element analysis of a structure and
graph theory search to find the sequence of damage events that requires the smallest
amount of energy. The minimum damage energy is a measure of robustness of
a structure.
Menchel [52] introduced an indicator of robustness of a structure with respect to
the removal of a column defining it as the maximum load factor that can be applied
to the dead and live loads when applied statically on the structure from which the
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considered column has been removed. The procedure to estimate such an indicator
of robustness is as follows: (1) remove a column from the model, (2) apply the
loads statically, multiplying them by an increasing factor, (3) when stresses can no
longer be redistributed, this factor is the indicator of robustness. In other words,
the indicator of robustness is a measure of the resistance reserve of a structure with
regard to the loads applied to it and for the removal of a specific column.
4.7.2. Measures based on structural attributes
As mentioned before the third measure of robustness defined by Starossek and
Haberland [68] falls into the group of measures based on structural attributes, here
specifically on structural stiffness and can be expressed as
Rs = min
j
detKj
detK0
(4.11)
where Rs - stiffness-based robustness measure, K0 and Kj – global stiffness matrix
of the intact structure and the structure after removal of a structural element or
a connection j, respectively. The authors state that there is a relatively low correla-
tion between the reduction in load capacity after the loss of structural element and
the assigned measure of robustness Rs. However this formulation has two advantages
namely: simplicity and ease of calculation. This approach can be appropriate for
zipper-type collapse and useless for pancake-type or domino-type collapses as defined
in [66] and summarised above in Section 4.4.
Agarwal et al. [3] introduced a topological measure of vulnerability referring to
the theory of form and connectivity. Basically it investigates the potential hazards
present in the structural form which could be triggered by unexpected events or
unforeseen loading conditions. The theory consists of three steps which are: iden-
tifying so called structural rings and rounds, creating a hierarchical description of
the structure and searching through the structural hierarchy to look for vulnerable
scenarios. This approach is developed for 2D and 3D frames.
4.8. Other topics
Tagel-Din and Rahman [72] present a new progressive collapse simulation method
based on the Applied Element Method (AEM). The method takes into account load
thread, separation of structural parts and possible collisions resulting from falling
debris. In the Applied Element Method, a structure is modelled as an assembly
of small elements connected be a series of springs. Partial connectivity occurring
during progressive collapse is allowed and modelled by means of springs. When
modelling a structure, all that is required is to define the material type, or property
of different interfaces.
Moore [54] presents how provisions in British Standards defined after the Ronan
Point collapse improved the situation in the UK. Moore states that engineers mainly
used indirect approach (tie force requirements). In addition, the author proposes to
extend the application of the current UK building regulations to all buildings, and
not only to 5 or more storey buildings.
Report NIST Best Practices [56] gives the state-of-the-art on progressive col-
lapse, based on British Standards, ASCE, EC and other national and local code
standards as well as based on GSA Guidelines, DoD UFC guidelines. The main top-
ics included in the report are: consideration acceptable risk, building vulnerabilities
(continuity, load reversals), means of risk reduction (event control, structural analy-
sis), detailed description of indirect and direct approaches, extensive comparison of
code, standards and national guidelines. The document summarises best practices
for designing different type of structures (r/c, steel, masonry etc.).
In 2011 the COST Action TU0601 group concluded their work on robustness of
structures in [14]. The purpose of this document is to provide additional information
to designers, structural analysts, regulatory authorities etc. The document is also
aimed at providing assistance to the committees developing codes and standards
(e.g. CEN TC250 and ISO TC98). The particular aspects dealt in this document
contain:
• failure of more than one load-bearing element, by considering the various types
of loading,
• assessment and quantification of robustness (most of the robustness indices are
described in Chapter 4.7),
• risk-based decision-making,
• methods for providing robustness (e.g. specific local resistance method, alternate
load path method, tie force method etc.),
• robustness during construction,
• effects of poor quality and deterioration of material.
In 2011 US Department of Homeland Security [73] issued comprehensive techni-
cal report on how to prevent structures from collapsing to limit damage to adjacent
structures and additional loss of life when explosives devices impact highly populated
urban centers. The main focus is on:
• the influence of the presence of buildings on the blast pressures propagating from
explosions located in urban settings,
• the potential for these blast pressures to damage primary structural members of
buildings,
• the sensitivity of several common building design types to experience progressive
collapse due to damage of key support members, and
• the likelihood that blast pressures may damage building equipment needed for
emergency evacuation, rescue and recovery operations.
The results the studies were integrated in the prototype of a fast running software
program, concentrated on the Manhattan Financial District.
Stevens et al. [71] ...
5. Examples of progressive collapse
This chapter presents selected examples of building progressive collapses. Al-
though the number of progressive collapses in the history is quite small, the catas-
trophic consequences in terms of fatalities and other losses, which this phenomenon
entails, brings a lot of attention in society, governments and community of civil
engineers. Moreover, the growing threat of terrorist attacks makes the problem of
progressive collapse should be considered when designing and constructing buildings.
5.1. Ronan Point
The Ronan Point Apartment building was erected in London between 1966 and
1968. It was a 23 storey, and 64m high building. The structural system consisted
of precast concrete walls and floors. The floors were supported by the lower storeys
walls. The floors and walls were fitted by slots and bolted together. The connections
were filled with dry packed mortar. Thus, this structural system was characterised
by very limited ability to redistribute loads and was prone to progressive collapse
when exposing to a local failure.
On May 16, 1968, an exterior panel of the 18th floor was blown out due to
an internal gas explosion of a leaking gas stove. The loss of this panel caused the
progressive collapse of upper floors (19 through 23) and subsequently the falling
debris invoked the progressive collapse of lower floors down to the ground floor. The
result of the progressive collapse can be seen in Fig. 5.1.
More details can be found in [56].
5.2. Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building located in Oklahoma City was an of-
fice building of the U.S. government constructed between 1970 and 1976. It was
a nine-storey, reinforced concrete structure, 61m long, 21.4m wide. The structural
system was formed by columns (on 6.1m × 10.7m grid) and a beam/slab system.
The regularity of the frame was interrupted on the north elevation where the span
between columns was doubled and these columns supported deep transfer girders.
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Figure 5.1. Ronan Point Apartment after collapse [16]
It should be noted that the reinforced concrete frame was designed and constructed
in a non-ductile manner.
On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building became the target of
a terrorist attack. The explosive charge was detonated from a truck situated 4m
from one of the columns. The power of the blast was estimated to 1800 kg of TNT
equivalent (see Osteraas [57]). The direct blast destroyed one column, then the blast
wave destroyed floors and beams which in turn was the cause for buckling the other
three columns due to lack of lateral supports. Two illustrations of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building after the progressive collapse can be seen in Fig. 5.2 and
5.3.
After investigating the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building case, Osteraas [57]
concludes with four statements, which should be applied in progressive collapse
design, namely:
• avoiding significant irregularities in the layout configuration and using transfer
girders, to ensure the possibility of alternative load paths,
• the frame should enable the slabs and walls to fail without destroying the frame,
• the frame should be robust and ductile to sustain large deformations,
• lower perimeter columns should be designed to resist direct blast waves as much
as possible.
The author states that the third conclusion can entail adopting detailing from seismic
engineering and applying it for designing important buildings in nonseismic zones.
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Figure 5.2. Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building [60]
Figure 5.3. Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building (Note the brittle failure of the transfer
girder due to non-ductile design) [15]
Further details can be found in [56, 57].
5.3. L’Ambiance Plaza
L’Ambiance Plaza in Bridgeport, Connecticut, was a 16-storey apartment build-
ing which collapsed in April 1987 while being under construction (see Fig. 5.4). The
building was erected using lift-slab method, which required the slabs to be cast on
the ground and then lifted into place using jacketing operations. The total collapse
happened after finishing one of the jacketing operations (see Fig. 5.5). After the
investigations of the collapse by Heger [42], there were reported four main struc-
tural deficiencies which could cause the collapse, namely: (1) improper placement
of post-tensioning tendons adjacent to elevator openings, (2) overstressed concrete
slab sections adjacent to two temporary floor slots for cast-in-place shear walls, (3)
overstressed and excessively flexible steel lifting angles during slab lifting, and (4)
unreliable and inadequate temporary slab-column connections to ensure frame sta-
bility. On the other hand, Dusenberry [22] states that possible causes that initiated
Figure 5.4. L’Ambiance Plaza during the construction phase [22]
the collapse were: failure of shear collars, improper configuration of tendons, overall
stability, plumbing operation, lateral soil pressure and frozen concrete, while the
direct reason for the complete collapse could be the use of a very mild steel and
incomplete construction.
More details can be found in [42, 51, 56].
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Figure 5.5. L’Ambiance Plaza after the collapse [22]
6. Summary and conclusions
The aim of this report is to review the state-of-the-art of progressive collapse pro-
cedures and strategies provided in codes and standards as well as in selected national
specific guidelines (e.g. DoD UFC Guidelines [20], GSA Guidelines [40]). Recent
growing interest in the subject of progressive collapse of civil engineering structures,
resulted in an observed increased number of scientific publications. Findings from
several important papers are also reviewed in Section 4.
To summarise the provisions raised in the studied documents, selected aspects are
presented in the following tables. A comparison of load combinations for progressive
collapse analysis in the different documents is presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Comparison of load combinations in different documents
Document Load Combinations Remarks
BS D + L/3 +W/3
Eurocode see Eq. (3.5)
ASCE 7-05 (0.9 or 1.2)D + (0.5L or 0.2S) + 0.2Wn alternate load path method
1.2D +Ak + (0.5L or 0.2S) specific local resistance m.
(0.9 or 1.2)D +Ak + 0.2Wn specific local resistance m.
GSA 2(D + 0.25L) static analysis,
D + 0.25L dynamic analysis,
UFC 4-023-03 (0.9 or 1.2)D + (0.5L or 0.2S) + 0.2Wn nonlinear dynamic analysis
2[(0.9 or 1.2)D + (0.5L or 0.2S) + 0.2Wn] nonlinear static analysis
D – dead load,
L – live load,
W – wind load,
S – snow load.
A comparison of accidental loads for designing key elements in the different
documents is presented in Table 6.2. It should be noted that the Eurocodes inherited
the value of 34 kPa from the British Standards. In many places, however, this value
is questioned as being too high. On the other hand, other documents presented in
the table do not specify the value leaving it to the authorities. The U.S. guidelines,
overall, prefer the alternate load path method instead of the specific local resistance
method, and do not mention accidental loads at all.
Table 6.3 presents a comparison of allowable local collapse areas in the selected
documents. These limitations are similar, however DoD UFC Guidelines [20] distin-
guishes the limitations depending on where the local damage takes place.
Table 6.2. Comparison of accidental loads for designing key elements in different docu-
ments
Document Accidental load
BS 34 kPa
Eurocodes 34 kPa
ASCE 7-05 Ak (to be specified by the authorities)
GSA -
UFC 4-023-03 -
Table 6.3. Comparison of allowable local collapse areas in different documents
BS Eurocodes GSA UFC 4-023-03
15% of floor or
roof area or 70m2
(whichever is less).
Extent of initial
damage and one
adjacent level either
above or below.
The limit of admis-
sible local failure
may be different
for each type of
building. The rec-
ommended value is
15% of the floor or
100m2 (whichever
is smaller) in each
of two adjacent
storeys.
Structural bay
associated with the
removed element.
167m2 at the floor
directly above
a removed exterior
column or 334m2
at the floor directly
above a removed
interior column.
Removal of exterior
column: 70m2
or 15% of the
total floor area
(whichever is less),
Removal of interior
column: 140m2
or 30% of the
total floor area
(whichever is less)
For some time, the national codes and standards have included general provisions
on how to design structure for progressive collapse resistance. However, they still
lack more detailed guidance for engineers, since some aspects are not explained in
depth. It seems that more detailed commentary with calculated examples would be
required. For example, in Eurocode, there is no precise specification what dynamic
amplification factor should be used when an equivalent static analysis is employed.
This gap is partly fulfilled in U.S. guidelines where more detailed step by step
procedures for progressive collapse design are given and the dynamic amplification
factor equal to 2, for quasi-static analysis is provided. A few papers (e.g. Powell
[58], Ruth et al. [61]) state that this value is too conservative.
The other problem is the not so clear behaviour of buildings when internal or
external explosions caused by explosives occur. To shed more light on this issue,
appropriate tools should be developed to simulate such phenomena, followed, if
possible, by validating experiments.
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A. Formulas for plastic hinges in beams and
columns
Default plastic hinges properties of SAP 2000 are based on ATC-40 [6] and
FEMA [37] criteria using the following formulas for defining the rotation at yield θy:
a) for beams:
θy =
ZFyelb
6EIb
(A.1)
b) for columns:
θy =
ZFyelc
6EIc
(1−
P
Pye
) (A.2)
These refer to the plastic moment capacity as follows
a) for beams:
QCE =MCE = ZFye (A.3)
b) for columns:
QCE =MCE = 1.18ZFye(1−
P
Pye
) ≤ ZFye (A.4)
where:
E – modulus of elasticity,
Fye – expected yield strength of the material,
I – moment of inertia,
lb – beam length,
lc – column length,
MCE – expected moment strength,
P – axial force in the member,
Pye – expected axial yield force of the member (Pye = AgFye),
Q – generalised component load,
QCE – generalised component expected strength,
θ – chord rotation (see Fig. A.1),
θy – yield rotation,
Z – plastic section modulus,
69
Fig. A.1 defines chord rotation for beams. So the chord rotation can be estimated
by adding the yield rotation θy to the plastic rotation. Alternatively, the chord
rotation can be taken as equal to the storey drift.
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a) cantilever example b) frame example
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Figure A.1. Definition of chord rotation (∆ - displacement, ∆y - displacement at yield,
θ – chord rotation, θy – yield rotation.)
 
 
 
 
 
B. Progressive Collapse and Blast Simulation 
Techniques 
 
      
     Buildings and other critical infrastructures become often the target of terrorist 
bombing attacks. A typical pressure wave curve [b1], which will eventually load a 
structure, at some distance from an explosion is shown in Figure B.1. Its main 
characteristics concerning damaging effects on structures are the magnitude of the 
overpressure, the duration of the positive phase and especially its impulse, i.e., the area 
under the curve over the positive phase. This impulsive load will be delivered to a 
structure in a few milliseconds forcing it to respond or fail in a peculiar mode. 
 
 
                                                    
Figure B.1. Blast wave pressure curve characteristics; Ps= maximum overpressure, Po= 
ambient pressure, ta= arrival time, td= positive phase duration, tn= negative phase 
duration. 
 
 
     A plausible and very likely scenario of failure includes the blasting-off of one or two 
columns of the building, as schematic shown in Figure B.2, which will trigger excessive 
deformations and further damage. If not arrested, this may lead to progressive collapse, 
i.e., the local failure propagates in a disproportionate manner to cause a partial or even 
global failure. As mentioned above in the report, this was the case of the Government 
Building collapse at the Oklahoma city bombing.   
 
     It is important that the mechanical structure itself mitigates some effects of the 
explosion and certainly escapes progressive collapse, and this necessitates proper design. 
Several models, numerical simulations and techniques exist today, which can aid and 
provide the basis for a blast resistant design of structures. A fundamental prerequisite for 
the use of these tools is that they first must have been thoroughly validated with reliable 
experimental data from field tests. However, field tests with actual explosions are 
expensive and are usually performed within military grounds. 
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Figure B.2. Schematic loss of the middle column in a reinforced-concrete building frame 
due to blast pressure p. 
 
     Thus alternative testing methods are desirable, and this has been the case at the 
University of California in San Diego (UCSD), where the first blast simulator facility 
was  built in  2006.  As claimed,  the effects of  bomb  are  generated without the use of 
explosive materials. The facility produces repeatable, controlled blast load simulations on 
full-scale  columns and  other  structural components.   The simulator recreates the speed 
and force of explosive shock waves through servo-controlled hydraulic actuators with 
special masses attached at their ends, that punch properly the test specimens. The impulse 
delivered resembles that of Figure B.1 of a real explosion. Such an experiment of the 
simulation of the “column removal” scenario, reproduced from references [b2,b3], is 
shown in Figure B.3. 
 
 
    
 
Figure B.3. Photo sequence of the evolution of damage in reinforced-concrete column 
under blast simulator impact at the UCSD facility. 
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Abstract 
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progressive collapses of real buildings are presented. 
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